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Abstract 
The Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical and reranking terms 
is one of the most widely used tools in measurement of income redistribution. This 
paper describes how the decomposition has emerged, how its proponents managed to 
expand and upgrade it, and how extensively it has been employed in empirical 
research. However, the arguments are presented that the decomposition features 
certain methodological problems and therefore a reinterpretation is called for. 
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1  Introduction 
The last three decades have seen a world-wide interest in the measurement of the 
redistributive effects of fiscal systems. The research in this field is underpinned by a wide belief 
that the state has a major role in the determination of economic inequality in a society. The 
contention is undeniably proved by various empirical studies. Many researchers in the field of 
income redistribution posed further natural questions: what are the contributions of individual 
taxes and benefits to the redistributive effect? 
The literature on the measurement of the redistributive effect started to grow in the mid-
seventies, perhaps half of decade after the seminal works in the closely related field of economic 
inequality measurement. Although the first famous paper on the redistributive effect was written 
by Musgrave and Thin (1948) sixty years ago, the works of Jakobsson (1976) and Kakwani 
(1977a, 1977b) have established the propositions fundamental for all further research. As 
Lambert (2001) points out: “Their central results are known […] as Jakobsson/Kakwani 
theorems, and they expose the links between progressive income taxation and concentration 
curve properties of the distributions of tax and of post-tax income”. 
Progressive tax pushes the income Lorenz curve toward the line of equality. The 
magnitude of this movement, measured as the difference between Gini coefficients of pre-tax 
and post-tax incomes, is nowadays known as the redistributive effect, and the greater the tax 
progressivity and the average tax rate, the larger the redistributive effect will be. All these 
notions were explained by Kakwani (1977b). However, one phenomenon remained hidden for 
some time, until Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick (1981) uncovered it. They noticed that taxation 
induces another process besides narrowing of income distances – income units reranking, which 
is simply measured as a difference between the Gini and the concentration index of post-tax 
income. 
The great synthesis of all these concepts arrived in Kakwani (1984) as a decomposition of 
the redistributive effect into vertical or progressivity and reranking terms. It became and 
remained one of the most important tools in the income redistribution literature. The popularity 
of this decomposition rests on its comprehensiveness (capturing different notions of 
redistributive justice), simplicity and ease of computation as well as its availability for 3 
 
straightforward policy interpretation (redistributive power can be enhanced if horizontal inequity 
is reduced). 
The current paper is a critical overview of the Kakwani methodology, of the most 
important methodologies rooted in Kakwani decomposition, and of the empirical research in 
income redistribution. Some doubt and criticism is cast upon the Kakwani decomposition by 
other eminent scholars, which has, however, been mostly neglected. Here, the issues are 
reopened and the paper calls for further investigation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section two contains description of how the 
decomposition and its component indices have emerged. In the third section, the most important 
extensions and upgrades of the decomposition are presented. Examination of empirical research, 
which verifies that the Kakwani decomposition is a central methodological tool in the field, is in 
the fourth section. The paper ends with conclusion and recommendations for further research. 
2  Kakwani decomposition of redistributive effect 
The decomposition 
Redistributive effect 
The standard and the most popular measure of the redistributive strength of a fiscal (tax, 
or benefit) system is called the redistributive effect (RE ). It is defined as a difference between 
Gini coefficients of pre-fiscal (-tax, -benefit) income ( X G ) and post-fiscal (-tax, -benefit) income 
( N G ), as shown in (1). 
(1)     N X G G RE    
Some other indices are also called “redistributive effect”, but should be distinguished 
from the redistributive effect as defined in (1). Musgrave and Thin (1948) proposed a different 
index (
MT RE ), which also relates the indices  X G  and  N G , but in the way shown by (2). 
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Reynolds and Smolensky’s (1977) index of the redistributive effect (
RS RE ) is very similar 
to  RE  in (1), but instead of Gini coefficient of post-fiscal income ( N G ), we find here a 
concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income (
x
N D ), as presented in (3). 
(3)    
x
N X
RS D G RE    
Observe the important difference between the Gini ( N G ) and concentration (
x
N D ) indices 
of post-fiscal income.  N G  is obtained for the Lorenz curve of post-fiscal incomes,  ) (p LN , while 
x
N D  is calculated for the concentration curve of post-fiscal incomes,  ) (p C
x
N . While for  ) (p LN  
the units are sorted in ascending order of post-fiscal income, for  ) (p C
x
N  the income units are 
ordered by pre-fiscal income; hence, x in the superscript of  ) (p C
x
N . It is proved (e.g. in Lambert, 
2001) that the concentration curve, such as  ) (p C
x
N , never lies below the corresponding Lorenz 
curve, here  ) (p LN , and therefore,  N G  can never be lower than 
x
N D . 
Kakwani decomposition: original vs. modern presentation 
The decomposition of the redistributive effect (RE ) that is central to this investigation is 
first presented in Kakwani (1984:159-163) and repeated with minor differences, mostly in 
notation, in Kakwani (1986:82-86). The aim of the model is to capture two well-known 
theoretical concepts – horizontal and vertical equity – into a unified measurement framework. 
The original methodology used a different presentation (and notation) from the one that is usual 
nowadays, but it will be useful to compare these two. Kakwani expressed the main components 
in terms of the pre-tax Gini coefficient, as follows. The redistributive effect (R) is the difference 
between the Gini coefficients of pre- and post-tax income, as in (1), but divided by  X G , as in (4). 








The redistributive effect (R) is decomposed into the sum of horizontal inequity (H ) and 
vertical equity (V ) terms, as shown in (5). 
(5)     V H R    5 
 
The horizontal inequity index (H ) is a difference between the concentration coefficient 
of post-tax income (
x
N D ) and  N G , normalized by  X G , as in (6). The vertical equity index (V ) is 
equal to Kakwani progressivity index (
K
T P ) scaled by the average tax rate (
x t ), and normalized 
by  X G , as shown by (7). 



















) 1 ( 
  
Modern exposition is different in several respects. The notion “horizontal inequity” is 
changed into “reranking”, for reasons that will be discussed below. The Kakwani horizontal 
inequity term (H ), based on the difference  N
x
N G D  , is replaced by its negative correspondent, 
x
N N D G  , and named more conveniently as the Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking (
AP R ). In 
addition, the components are presented as “absolute” values of coefficients, and not in terms of 
relative to  X G . Thus, what we have in (8) is representing the decomposition of the redistributive 
effect (RE ) into Kakwani vertical effect (
K V ) and Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking (
AP R ). 
(8)    
AP K R V RE    
The differences between two presentations are shown in Table 1. The Kakwani horizontal 
inequity term (H ) can never be positive. On the other side, the Atkinson-Plotnick index of 
reranking (  H R
AP   ) is always non-negative. The minus sign in front of the reranking term, in 
the modern expression (8), better reflects the common notion that reranking reduces the 
redistributive effect (more on this, below). 
Table 1: Presentation of Kakwani decomposition 
Original Modern 
Redistributive effect 







   (1)     N X G G RE    6 
 
Index of progressivity 




T G D P    
Horizontal / Reranking effect 









   (11) 
x
N N
AP D G R    
Vertical effect 
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Decomposition of the redistributive effect 
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(8)    
AP K R V RE    
 
Horizontal inequity or reranking? 
The principle of vertical equity requires that people with larger income pay higher taxes 
than those with lower income. The standard definition of horizontal equity in taxation requires 
that people with equal income pay equal taxes. Violation of this principle gives rise to horizontal 
inequity. Following several other authors, Kakwani identifies horizontal inequity with reranking. 
However, it seems that by decomposition of the redistributive effect into H (
AP R ) and V  (
K V ) 
we obtain two measures that both deal with unequal treatment of unequals. The following 
example will prove this contention. 
If we want to measure the violation of equality, we must first be able to define equals. 
People with different ranks are usually not in equal positions. For example, person A has income 
of 100$ and B has 500$. Imagine that the fiscal process reversed their incomes, and now A has 
500$ and B only 100$: reranking occurred. Everybody will agree that inequity has happened, but 
should we call it horizontal inequity? A and B were not in equal positions before the fiscal 
action: B had five times larger income than A. The followers of Kakwani decomposition have 7 
 




Origins of vertical effect 
The Kakwani index of tax progressivity (
K
T P ) has emerged as a reaction to certain 
inadequacies of Musgrave and Thin “index of progressivity” (
MT RE ) and the index of the 
redistributive effect (RE ). For Kakwani (1977b), two tax systems with equal elasticity of tax 
liability to pre-tax income, over the whole income distribution, should be judged as equally 
progressive. As Kakwani shows, the proposed index (
K
T P ) satisfies this requirement, while the 
indices 
MT RE  and RE  fail in this task. 
Kakwani (1977a, 1977b) proved the following relationship between the index of 
progressivity and the redistributive effect, shown in (17).
2 











According to equation (17), the redistributive effect (RE ) represents the reduction of 
inequality of taxation, but it does not measure tax progressivity. Two equally progressive tax 
systems with different average tax rates would therefore be erroneously observed as differently 
progressive by RE  or 
MT RE . 
Origins of the reranking effect 
The concept of the reranking effect that appears in the Kakwani decomposition was 
derived almost simultaneously and independently by two scholars, Atkinson (1980) and Plotnick 
(1981).
3 Analyzing empirical literature, Atkinson concluded that some studies used the 
                                                      
1 Obvious contribution to renaming came from Aronson, Johnson and Lambert (1994) who invented a 
decomposition of the redistributive effect into vertical, horizontal and reranking distinctive effects (see more on this 
below). Also, see the serious criticism of horizontal inequity by Kaplow (1989; 2000). 
2 Observe that (17) differs from (15): the former equation did not recognize the existence of reranking.  
3 Hence the superscript AP in 
AP R , defined in (11). Both works contain “horizontal (in)equity” in their titles. In the 
previous section we have seen the problem with the term “horizontal”, and why “reranking” is a better choice. 8 
 
concentration coefficient of post-fiscal income (
x
N D ), which understates the true post-fiscal 
inequality, as would be measured by the corresponding Gini coefficient of post-fiscal income 
( N G ). Consequently, a measure 
x
N X D G   (identical to Reynolds-Smolensky index, 
RS RE ) 
overstates the redistributive effect of fiscal system ( RE RE
RS  ). Therefore, for Atkinson, one 
motive for measurement of reranking would be a correct assessment of income redistribution. 
The other is to estimate the magnitude of mobility along the income scale induced by the fiscal 
process. 
Atkinson explained several ways in which the new concept of reranking could be 
measured, but left the issue of choosing the best one somewhat open. He was not very inclined 
toward single index measures, as “any such summary statistic involves assumptions that may be 
little more than arbitrary”. Use of the transition matrix
4 or Lorenz and concentration curves was 
considered much more preferable. 
Contrary to that, a single index measure of reranking is the most widely used form of 
presentation. This approach started with Plotnick, whose index is  N
AP P G R R / % 100   . 
Expressing reranking as a percentage of the post-fiscal Gini coefficient has logical background: 
the maximum value of 
AP R  is exactly  N G .
5 Plotnick also suggested stating 
AP R  as a percentage 
of RE , which has become standard practice in empirical studies. 
Plotnick also discusses the issue of the appropriate benchmark ranking of income units. In 
order to evaluate inequity, we must first establish what is equitable. The pre-fiscal ranking is said 
to be a natural choice, supported by both theoretical works and common belief, that the ordering 
of people emerging as a result of activities on the market should not be disturbed in the fiscal 
process.
6 Of course, we should be able to properly calculate pre-fiscal incomes, i.e. incomes in 
                                                      
4 The transition matrix shows complete and detailed transformation of income vector from one ordering to another in 
steps, where each step involves changing the ranks of two units. For example, before step t, A has income a and rank 
v; B has income b and rank w. After step t, A has income b and rank w, while B has income a and rank v. 
5 In this extreme case, when ranks of all units are changed,  ) (p C
x
N  lies above the line of absolute equality and is 
symmetrical to  ) (p LN . 
6 In the last passage, Atkinson (1980:18) briefly mentions several different conceptual views on the overall issue of 
(re)ranking and horizontal inequity.  9 
 
the absence of fiscal activities, and this is likely an impossible task. Still, relying on certain fiscal 
incidence assumptions and existing data we can produce some estimates of fiscal inequities. 
The role of reranking: advice to future developers 
In the view of Atkinson (1980), reranking does not influence overall redistributive effect, 
RE  (see also Jenkins (1988), and Duclos (1993), who shared this view). He states: “Changes in 
the ranking of observations as a result of taxation do not in themselves affect the degree of 
inequality in the post-tax distribution. They do, however, influence certain ways of representing 
the redistribution and of calculating summary measures of inequality.” This is a very important 
statement, with the following messages that can be deduced. Researchers should be aware of the 
extent of reranking caused by the fiscal system in order to make judgments about the quality of 
the redistributive process. Reranking is a by-product or a consequence of an income 
redistribution process; it does not contribute, positively or negatively, to the redistributive effect. 
It is interesting that Plotnick (1981) had similar thoughts on the relationship between the 
measures of reranking and the redistributive effect. In his model “the structure of post-
redistribution income inequality is taken as a datum by the measure”. As in Atkinson (1980), this 
implies that the reranking should not be interpreted as a factor that produces redistribution. 
Instead, “...given the change in inequality, the measure should tell us how seriously the 
redistributive activities violated the norms of horizontal equity.” Also, Plotnick warns that the 
measure of reranking “should not attempt to compare the actual extent of redistribution or 
change in inequality to some exogenous criterion. Doing so would be an exercise in measuring 
vertical inequity.” 
Thus, both Atkinson and Plotnick, more or less explicitly, avoid setting the reranking 
effect into any context other than the measurement of “horizontal inequity”. Although aware of 
the strong connection between the concepts of vertical and horizontal equity, they do not attempt 
to build a comprehensive model capturing both of them. They implicitly suggest to future users 




It seems that the message did not reach Kakwani, whose “horizontal inequity” term H  
(
AP R H  ) is given a specific interpretation: it measures a reduction of the redistributive effect ( 
“increase in inequality”). New interpretation of the decomposition has later emerged in literature, 
which goes as in the following passage:  
A progressive fiscal system is “good” because it reduces inequality. In case of progressivity, 
Kakwani vertical effect (
K V ) is positive, and the larger it is, the “better”. On the other side, 
reranking increases inequality. In the presence of reranking, the Atkinson-Plotnick index (
AP R ) 
is positive and the larger it is, the “worse”. Furthermore, 
K V  measures a “potential” 
redistributive effect, attainable in the absence of reranking. Because of reranking, actual 
redistribution amounts “only” to 
AP K R V RE   . If reranking could be somehow eliminated, 
redistributive effect would be equal to the potential amount: 
K potential V RE  . 
This interpretation contributed significantly to the popularity of Kakwani decomposition 
among applied researchers and scholars as well. It is straightforward, capturing some of the 
desired qualities of a fiscal system (achievement of vertical and horizontal equity), and offers 
deceptively simple advice to policymakers (simply by reduction of horizontal inequity – without 
additional resources – you can increase the redistributive effect to a certain extent). Although the 
interpretation based on “potential redistributive effect” was not present in Kakwani (1984; 1986), 
we may say it was firmly inspired these contributions. 
Criticism by Lerman and Yitzhaki and their new framework 
Substantive criticism of the Kakwani decomposition is presented in the article by Lerman 
and Yitzhaki (1995) (henceforth LY). They develop their own decomposition of the 
redistributive effect, following, in fact, the philosophy of Kakwani, but arriving at different 
conclusions about the role of reranking. In their view, reranking positively contributes to the 
creation of overall inequality reduction, together with another component, “gap narrowing”, 
which corresponds to vertical effect in Kakwani’s model.  
Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) claim that their method enables a decomposition of the 
redistributive effect “into two exclusive, exhaustive terms”. As Kakwani, they too regard 
reranking as an independent source of the redistributive effect. Perhaps, this is most explicitly 11 
 
stated in the abstract of the article: “...policies may reduce inequality by rearranging rankings as 
well.”
7 They even claim that Atkinson supported this view, saying that he indicated “that the 
reranking effect might be important in explaining a proportion of the impact of taxes on 
inequality.” However, we have already seen that, in fact, Atkinson regarded that reranking could 
only explain the discrepancy between two measures of the redistributive effect, namely RE and 
RS RE ; he explicitly noted that reranking does not affect the redistributive effect. 
Table 2: Comparison of Kakwani and Lerman-Yitzhaki decompositions 
Lerman-Yitzhaki Kakwani 
Index of progressivity 








T G D P    
Horizontal / Reranking effect 
(19)   
n
X X
LY D G R     (11) 
x
N N
AP D G R    
Vertical effect 



























Decomposition of the redistributive effect 
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(23) 
LY LY R V RE    







N X D G
t
P t
G G  

   




N X N X D G D G G G       
(8)    
AP K R V RE    
Table 2 presents the LY system in comparison with Kakwani’s. The main difference in 
the two approaches lies in the “reference” income: in the former model, it is the post-fiscal 
income, whereas in the latter, it is the pre-fiscal income. Observe that the LY index of 
progressivity (
LY
T P ) and vertical effect (
LY V ), defined in (18) and (23), compare the 
concentration coefficients of tax (
n
T D ) and pre-fiscal income (
n
X D ) with Gini coefficient of post-
                                                      
7 Other places are: (a) p.46, „one might well care about whether inequality reductions result from reranking or from 
gap-narrowing“. (b) p.46, „In this paper we ask: to what extent is the overall redistributive impact of U.S. taxes and 
transfers the result of rerankings of income versus pure reductions in income gaps (holding rankings constant)?“ (c) 
p.55, „For taxes, the reranking component amounted to nearly 40 percent of the total reduction in inequality.“ 12 
 
tax income ( N G ). Here, 
n
T D  and 
n
X D  are derived from the concentration curves for which the 
units are sorted in the ascending order of post-fiscal income (hence n in the superscript), namely 
) (p C
n
T  and  ) (p C
n
X . Also, the average tax rate (
n t ) is expressed in terms of post-fiscal income. 
Decomposition of the redistributive effect is shown by (23), and the noticeable difference in 
comparison with (8) lies in the sign in front of the reranking term – it is positive. Recall that 
AP R  
is non-negative due to its construction; the same is true for 
LY R  as well. 
LY do not say explicitly of what would happen with the redistributive effect if reranking 
disappeared or if it were somehow eliminated. However, their text does imply the interpretation 
already mentioned in many instances, based on “actual” and “potential” redistributive effect, 
which goes as follows: 
A progressive fiscal system is “good” because it reduces inequality. In case of progressivity, 
Lerman-Yitzhaki vertical effect (
LY V ) is positive, and the larger it is, the “better”. Reranking is 
another factor that decreases inequality. The higher the reranking and Lerman-Yitzhaki index 
(
LY R ), the “better” it is. Actual redistribution is equal to 
LY LY R V RE   . Therefore, in case 
that reranking is somehow reduced or eliminated, the redistributive effect would fall below RE , 
down to 
LY reranking no V RE 
_ . 
Why have LY decided to abandon the Kakwani decomposition of the redistributive effect 
and invent a new one? First, they criticize the Kakwani vertical effect: for given redistributive 
effect, 
K V  increases automatically when reranking is increased. Second, they suggest that “the 
after-tax ranking is the correct ranking for calculating progressivity”, because they believe it is a 
proper ranking in the analysis of marginal changes in the tax system. They illustrate this on an 
example of the rich and the poor taxpayer whose places on the income scale are reversed due to 
taxation. This would result in an increase of Kakwani progressivity (
K V ), that is based on pre-
tax rankings: this suggests that even more taxation of the “now poor” is desired. However, and 
unfortunately for the advancement of the field, they do not delve into any deeper technical 
elaboration of their criticism. 13 
 
3  Upgrades of methodology 
Frameworks capturing vertical and horizontal inequity and reranking 
Model by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert 
We have objected to identifying reranking with horizontal inequity: the latter should be 
concerned with unequal treatment of equals, while the former considers changing the order on 
the income scale of the unequals. The issue was reconciled by Aronson, Johnson and Lambert 
(1994) (henceforth AJL) with much praised methodology that decomposes the redistributive 
effect into vertical equity, horizontal inequity and reranking effects. The constraint of the model, 
from empirical an application perspective, is that it works only with true equals – units with 
identical income  x.  
Suppose we can partition the population (sample) into J  groups, such that in each group 
j  all  j K  units have equal pre-tax income  j x . Each member k  of group  j  has pre-tax income 
j x  and post-tax income  k j n , , after paying tax of  k j t , . Average tax paid by the group  j  is  j t .  
If everybody within each group  j  had identical post-tax income, it would mean that the 
system is horizontally equitable and there is no reranking. In reality, members within groups pay 
different taxes – this leads to horizontal inequity. It is the inequality of post-tax income within 
the groups that is the basis for AJL horizontal effect. It is equal to: 





j N j j
AJL G H
1
,    
where  j  ,  j   and  j N G ,  are, respectively, population share, post-tax income share and the Gini 
coefficient of post-tax income for the group  j . 
The basis for the calculation of vertical effect is a vector of taxes that would occur if all 
members within the group  j  paid  j t  instead of  k j t , ; call it 
x T ~ . This counterfactual tax is deemed 
free of horizontal inequity (but, is it free of reranking?). The AJL vertical effect is the Kakwani 
vertical effect obtained for 
x T ~  in (25), with 
K
T P~  explained in (26), where 
x
N D~  is the 
concentration coefficient for counterfactual post-income vector 
x x T X N ~ ~   . 14 
 


















T G D P   ~ ~  
Some unit z in group j may end with post-tax income  z j n , , such that  ) max( , , k e z j n n  , 
j K k ,..., 1  , and  j e  ; in other words, there may be at least one unit in a lower pre-tax income 
group e that has higher post-tax income than the unit z in group j. It means that the latter unit is 
reranked. AJL model enables measurement of reranking, and the corresponding term is 
AJL R , 
obtained as a residual  RE H V R
AJL AJL AJL    . In the AJL model, 
AJL R  is identical to 
AP R . 
Finally, we have the complete decomposition: 
(27)    
AJL AJL AJL R H V RE     
The main constraint of the AJL model is its non-conformability with real empirical data, 
where one can hardly find pre-tax exact equals. In the first applications, the researchers created 
artificially those equals, rounding pre-tax incomes of close equals.
8 This procedure has obviously 
distorted information about individual effects. 
Subsequent work by van de Ven, Creedy and Lambert (2001) transformed the original 
model to avoid the creation of artificial pre-tax equals. Instead, close equals groups are used.
9 
However, another problem remained unenvisaged by AJL model and this was the issue of whole-
group reranking. The recent model of Urban and Lambert (2008) enables decomposition of RE  
accounting for all these issues. 
AJL set their decomposition in the context of a welfare function, thus giving the indices a 
normative interpretation. They write: 
                                                      
8 For example, if units i, i+1 and i+2 have pre-tax incomes of $101, $102 and $103, the researcher may decide to 
transform all of them into pre-tax income $102. Now, imagine that all of them paid zero tax; their post-tax incomes 
are $101, $102 and $103. The AJL model would show the appearance of horizontal inequity, despite the fact that it 
does not occur. 
9 In the example from the previous footnote, the researcher might form the close pre-tax equals group of units i, i+1 
and i+2; their pre-tax incomes thus remain $101, $102 and $103. Nonetheless, this procedure also requires certain 
amount of artificial business, which seems to be inevitable when measurement of horizontal inequity is in question. 15 
 
(28)      
AJL x AJL x K
T
x x x x
F X T X R t H t P t RE t W W ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ~              
) )( 1 (
AJL AJL AJL x x R H V t       
Here,  T X W   and  F X W   are respectively social welfares after actual tax and after an equal-
yield proportional one; 
x   is the mean pre-tax income. The difference  F X T X W W     represents a 
welfare premium due to tax progressiveness. Minuses standing before the horizontal and 
reranking effects mean that they “provide subtractions from the welfare superiority of the actual 
tax code over a flat (distributionally neutral) one”. 
Lambert (2001) shows how these welfare indices are derived and obtains a corresponding 
welfare result for the more simple Kakwani (1984) decomposition, which shows how 
“rerankings detract from the welfare-enhancing property of an otherwise progressive tax 
system”. 
(29)     F X T X W W      RE t
x x ) 1 (     
AP x K
T
x x R t P t ) 1 (         
      ) )( 1 (
AP K x x R V t      
We have shown these results serve not only to offer another way of presenting 
decompositions, but also to discuss the various interpretations of the indexes. It is seen that 
horizontal and reranking effect are contributing negatively to overall redistributive effect. Does 
this also mean that RE  would be higher in the absence of horizontal inequity and reranking? The 
authors think it would, and explicitly confirm it: “If differences in tax treatment... could be 
eliminated..., the redistributive effect would have been increased, to around [ ) 1 ( 100
AJL V  ]% of 
its actual value...” (AJL:p.268). This interpretation of the results has become particularly 
popular, as it gives an apparently straightforward message which the researcher can send to 
policy-makers: “Through alignments of taxes and benefits, without additional resources, you can 
achieve two popular goals at the same time – eliminate horizontal injustices and further reduce 
post-fiscal inequality”. 16 
 
Model by Duclos, Jalbert and Araar 
The model suggested by Duclos, Jalbert and Araar (2003) follows the philosophy of AJL, 
in which the vertical effect enhances the reduction of inequality, while the horizontal and 
reranking effects diminish it. The redistributive effect is decomposed as in (30), and in (31) an 
extended version is presented. 
(30)    
DJA DJA DJA R H V RE     
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This model works with more general inequality indices, unlike AJL, which is based on 
ordinary Gini coefficients. The pre-tax income social welfare function is defined in the following 
way: 
(32)      dp v p w p X U v WX ) , ( ) ( ) , (
1
0      
where  ) , ( v p w  is a weighting scheme dependent on the ranks of income units,  p , and a 
parameter of inequality aversion, v; in this case we have 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) , (
  
v p v v p w ; note that 
 
1
0 1 ) , ( v p w .  ) (p X  is the pre-tax income of an income unit with rank  p  in the pre-tax income 
distribution, and  ) (y U  is a utility function with   as a parameter of relative risk aversion; 




 y y U  for  1    and  ) ln( ) ( y y U    for  1   . 
If everybody in society received identical income equal to  ) , ( v X    (the term is called the 
“equally distributed equivalent”, EDE), welfare would be the same as the actual. Then, by 
definition: 
(33)       ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , ( ) , (
1
0 ) , ( v U dp v p w v U v W v W X X v X X                
X   is then obtained from  X W  by inversion of the utility function: 
(34)     ) (
1
X X W U
     17 
 
where  
 ) 1 /( 1 1 ) 1 ( ) (

 
    y y U  for  1    and 
y e y U 
 ) (
1
  for  1   . 
Finally, the index of inequality,  X I , is given as: 





 1  
Returning to the model, the decomposition equation consists of several inequality indices, 
which can all be derived analogously to  X I . Here,  N I  is simply inequality of post-tax income. In 
one particular case, when  0    and  2  v , we obtain  X X G I   and  N N G I  , the ordinary Gini 
indexes. On the other side, 
E
N I  and 
P
N I  are based on counterfactual incomes and utilities. 
E
N I  is 
obtained for the distribution of conditional incomes,   
1
0 ) | ( ) ( dq p q N p N , which are the 
expected post-tax incomes of those at rank  p  in the distribution of pre-tax income. 
P
N I  is 
obtained for the distribution of expected utilities,   
1
0 )) | ( ( ) ( dq p q N U p U   . 
Extension to the net fiscal system 
The methodological challenge 
Analysts in the area of income redistribution are naturally interested in capturing the 
widest possible picture of a fiscal system, given data limitations and theoretical assumptions 
concerning fiscal incidence. Since the fiscal systems include at least several tax and benefit 
instruments, it is useful to know how each of them influences the redistribution, and what the 
interactions between them are.  
The Kakwani index of vertical effect can be readily applied to benefits, and the simplest 
way to estimate the effects of single taxes and benefits is to calculate the redistributive effect of 
each instrument, one by one, after choosing an appropriate reference income base. However, 
contributions obtained in such way do not simply add to the total redistributive effect of the net 
tax system; results from different data sources cannot be combined to get the overall 
redistribution (not even in case of “fiscal balance”); the interaction of different instruments 
obfuscates the situation. 18 
 
Lambert’s approach 
All these problems were envisaged and solved by Lambert (1985; 1988) who 
decomposed the redistributive effect of the net tax system into parts that explain the 
contributions of taxes and benefits individually. As (36) demonstrates, the Kakwani vertical 
effect for the combined system of taxes and benefits (
K
B T V & ) is a weighted average of vertical 
effects (or indices of progressivity) obtained for taxes (
K
T V ) and benefits (
K
B V ), where the 
weights are shares of taxes and benefits in pre-fiscal income (
x t  and 
x b ). 
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Table 3: Lambert’s decomposition for the net fiscal system 
Auxiliary terms and decompositions 
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The first important thing exposed by this decomposition is that the vertical effect of a net 






B T V V V   & . This helps us to reveal an interesting interaction: even if the overall tax system 
is regressive ( 0 
K
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10 
                                                      
10 For example, take that  05 . 0  
K
T V  and  10 . 0 
K
B V  and assume that  4 . 0  
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However, this framework does not tell us how different tax-benefit instruments contribute 
to overall reranking. “This would introduce severe analytical complications”, as Lambert (1985; 
footnote 2) points out. As we will see shortly, the two other scholars decided to deal with this 
intricate task. 
Jenkins’ decomposition 
Following the derivational grounds of Lambert (1985), who dealt with the vertical effect 
and admittedly ignored reranking, Jenkins (1988) decomposed the overall redistributive effect of 
the net fiscal system into tax and benefit contributions (RE ). Equation (43) replicates Jenkins’ 
formula 10, extending some of the terms. 
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The last three terms on the right side of (43) represent the reranking effects. The term 
) ( N
x
N G D   is simply 
AP R   or a measure of the overall reranking induced by a fiscal system 
consisting of taxes and benefits. The other two terms are the reranking effects that should reflect 
the contributions of taxes (the fourth term) and benefits (the fourth term). The decomposition 
(43) fully decomposes the redistributive effect (RE ). However, the contributions of taxes and 
benefits to reranking do not add up to total reranking (as measured by 
AP R ), and this may be 
judged as unsatisfactory. One may also pose a question, why in a measurement of reranking due 
to taxes (benefits) is the term  T X
x
T X G D     ( B X
x
B X G D    ) used instead of  X
x
T X G D    
( X
x
B X G D   )? Furthermore, the first two terms on the right side of (43) do not represent Kakwani 
vertical effects of taxes and benefits (as 
K
T V  and 
K
B V  in (36)), but something else.  
Duclos’ decomposition 
In another attempt to cope with the difficulties of the reranking effect decomposition was 
undertaken by Duclos (1993) and the formula (44) shows the result.  


































































In the start, one has to somehow order the tax/benefit variables and call them  M T T T , , , 2 1   
(with  0 0  T ). Any combination is allowed,
11 leading to a number of final results which are 
conveniently presented by a tree-root diagram (we will turn to this issue later again). Thus, for 
the first tax/benefit,  1 T  ( 1  k ) the variables in question should be  1 T X   and  X ; for the last 
tax/benefit,  M T  ( M k  ), the variables are N  and  M T N  . 
The first row of (44) is the already familiar Kakwani decomposition of the redistributive 
effect into the vertical and reranking effects. The first term in the second row is a decomposition 
of vertical effect from (36), but applied to M  individual tax or benefit instruments, each with its 
own concentration coefficient 
x
Tm D , and a share in pre-fiscal income 
x
m t .
12 The second term is 
then a corresponding decomposition of the reranking effect, which is separated into M  
differences between specifically defined concentration coefficients. 
For all tax/benefit instruments,  M k , , 1  , both concentration coefficients are obtained 
for (final) post-fiscal income (N ), as suggested by the subscripts N . Thus, the same variable is 
used to determine the contributions of all instruments. What makes the difference between the 
concentration coefficients is the ordering of units in the construction of the concentration curve. 
However, this matter is not very clear in the paper.  
Duclos (1993:356) says: “
  
k
m m T X N D
0 ,  indicates that the concentration curve used to build 
D  employs the ranking of units based on  
k
m m T







m m T X N D ? It must be 






m m T . But, if this is so, for  1  k , the 
                                                      
11 For example, if the fiscal system consists of instruments A, B and C, each of these can be  1 T ,  2 T  or  3 T , resulting 
in 6 possible orders. 
12 Duclos (1993) designates both taxes and benefits as taxes, using letter T. This made presentation his more simple, 
but at a loss of convenience. 21 
 
ordering is not defined. Also, the sums of taxes/benefits do not seem as intuitive variables for 
ranking income units. From the overall text, it may rather be guessed that the actual ordering 
variables are    
k
m m T X






m m T X . 
Let us show how it would work on a simple example of one tax ( T T  1 ) and one benefit 
( B T  2 ) instrument ( 2  M ). For  1  k , the ordering variable for the first concentration 
coefficient is  T X T X
m m    
1
0  and for the second it is  X T X
m m   
0
0 . For  2  k , we 
obtain  N B T X T X
m m      
2
0  and  T X T X
m m    
1
0 , respectively. The 
decomposition of the reranking effect for this one-tax-one-benefit case is then written as: 
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Other developments 
Kakwani-Lambert “new approach” 
The measurement system proposed by Kakwani and Lambert (1998) arises from three 
axioms of equitable taxation that deal with both horizontal and vertical equity considerations. 
The first axiom requires „minimal progression“: tax should increase monotonically with respect 
to income. The second axiom is based on the „progressive principle“, demanding that higher 
income people are faced with higher tax rates. The third axiom presents the „no reranking“ 
criterion: the marginal tax rate should not exceed 100 percent. The axioms are designed in such 
way as to be independent. 
The indices  1 S ,  2 S  and  3 S  are then constructed, whose zero value means that the 
respective axiom is upheld, or violated if the value is positive:  T
nR t S  1 ,  ) ( 2 T A
n R R t S    and 
) ( 3
AP
N R R S   , where 
x
T T T D G R   , 
x
A A A D G R    and 
x
N N N D G R    are obtained for taxes 
( i T ), average taxes ( i i i X T A /  ) and post-tax income ( i i i T X N   ), respectively. The 
redistributive effect can now be decomposed, as in (46). 
(46)     3 2 1 ) ( S S S R P t RE A
K n       22 
 
Recall that the Kakwani decomposition is  3 S P t RE
K n   . The term  ) ( A
K n R P t   is a measure 
of potential redistributive effect that “might be achieved if all inequities could be abolished.” It is 
analogous to 
K V , which is the potential redistributive effect achievable if reranking could be 
eliminated. However, as Kakwani and Lambert note, “there is no uniquely well-defined way to 
abolish axiom violations from a tax system, and thereby to say what maximal value of [RE ] 
might be achieved”. The decomposition was applied to Australian income tax data, resulting in 
an estimate of  0.0240  RE , while  ) ( A
K n R P t   was remarkably high at 0.1382. The authors 
conclude that RE  could be improved by removal of inequities “without change to the marginal 
rate structure which governs incentives.” 
Approach based on relative deprivation  
The relative deprivation of a person is a sum of the incomes of all people who are richer 
than that person. Using the concept of relative deprivation as a principle, Duclos (2000) invents 
the concepts of “fiscal harshness”, “fiscal looseness” and “ill-fortune”, and afterwards combines 
their measures to reinvent all the terms in the Kakwani decomposition(s). 
Kakwani’s index of progressivity (
K P ) is obtained as a difference between the mean-
normalized average fiscal harshness and average relative deprivation in the population. 
Kakwani’s index of vertical inequity (
K V ) is a difference between the mean-normalized average 
relative deprivation and average fiscal looseness. The Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking is 
the mean-normalized average of ill-fortune in the population.
13 
4  Empirical research in the field of income redistribution 
Overview of empirical studies 
Since the 70’s, when the major methodological innovations in the measurement of 
inequality, progressivity, and the redistributive effect emerged, there was a huge empirical 
interest in evaluating how fiscal systems affect income distribution. Table 4 presents a summary 
of studies that measure the redistributive effects of fiscal instruments and overall fiscal systems. 
                                                      
13 Loose definitions of the concepts follow. For person i  with pre-fiscal income  i X , relative deprivation (fiscal 
harshness; fiscal looseness) is a sum of  i j X X   ( i j T T  ; i j N N  ) for all  j  with  i j X X  . Ill-fortune occurs 
for person i , if  j i X X   and  j i N N  , and is measured in terms of  j N . 23 
 
The aim is not to provide a full review of the research in this field. Instead, we have primarily 
attempted to illustrate the variety of methodological approaches used in the estimation of the 
redistributive effects. It can be easily noted that most of the analyses are based on the works of 
Kakwani (1977b, 1984) – his progressivity index and his decomposition of RE . 
Another dimension shown in Table 4 is fiscal coverage of the studies. Many of them 
concentrate on single tax or benefit instruments. However, researchers are typically aware that 
all fiscal activities affect income distribution. Therefore, the studies often cover whole fiscal 
subsystems – personal taxes, indirect taxes, cash and in-kind benefits, and even complete fiscal 
systems.
14 Concerning the countries included in the research, the high-income countries like UK, 
USA, Canada, Australia and Sweden are the most represented. Only a few studies are devoted to 
low-income countries. 
Table 4: Overview of empirical studies in the field of income redistribution 
Authors Indices  / 
decompositions 
used 
Countries / Fiscal coverage  Data sources / equivalence 
scales 
Kakwani (1977b)  K P   (a) Australia, Canada, United 
Kingdom, United States: PIT; (b) 
Australia, Canada, U.S.: wide 
range of direct/indirect taxes and 
public expenditures 
(a) Official income-tax statistics, 
grouped data 
ITP 




RE   United States: wide range of 
direct/indirect taxes and public 
expenditures 
“Survey of Consumer Finances” 
(1950), “Survey of Consumer 
Expenditures” (1961), “Current 
Population Survey” (1970) 
Plotnick (1981)  AP R   United States: PIT, payroll tax, 
public cash benefits, food stamps  
“Michigan Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics” 
Dilnot, Kay, Norris 
(1984) 
MT  United Kingdom: PIT, SSC, 
indirect taxes 
“Family Expenditure Survey” 
four groups of households  
Berliant, Strauss 
(1985) 
BS, 16 other 
measures of VE 
and 1 of HI 
United States: PIT  “Statistics of Income Individual 
Tax Returns”; 
ITP 
Plotnick (1985)  AP R , 4 other 
measures of HI 
United States: PIT, SSC, social 
benefits 
“Current Population Survey” 
Kakwani (1986)  K84  Australia: PIT, property taxes, 
social benefits 
“Survey of Consumer Finances 
and Expenditures”; 
) 4 ,. 7 (. 3 E ,  ) 4 (. 1 E  
Nolan (1987)  Tm  United Kingdom: PIT, SSC, social 
benefits 
“Family Expenditure Survey” 
E : implied by certain benefit 
programs 
Jenkins (1988)  J88  United States: wide range of 
direct/indirect taxes and public 
“Current Population Survey”, 
other sources 
                                                      
14 It must be noted that the selection in Table 4 is biased toward the studies covering both taxes and benefits, since 
the empirical part of the overall research underlying this paper deals with taxes and benefits in Croatia. 24 
 
Authors Indices  / 
decompositions 
used 
Countries / Fiscal coverage  Data sources / equivalence 
scales 
expenditures 
Norregaard (1990)  K
T P   17 OECD countries: PIT, SSC  OECD data base (decile groups); 
ITP 
Ankrom (1993)  K84; L85  Sweden, United States, United 
Kingdom: PIT, SSC, property 
taxes, other direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, social benefits 
Household budget surveys; 
) 54 (. 1 E  
Duclos (1993)  K84, D93  United Kingdom: PIT, SSC, social 
benefits 
“Family Expenditure Survey” and 
author’s own tax-benefit model  
Aronson, Johnson, 
Lambert (1994) 
AJL  United Kingdom: PIT  “Family Expenditure Survey” and 
Tax-benefit model of the Institute 
for Fiscal Studies; 
   ) 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 ( 2 E  
Lerman, Yitzhaki 
(1994) 
LY94  United States: PIT, SSC, social 
benefits 
“Current Population Survey”; 
) 1 ( 1 E  
Bishop, Chow, 
Formby (1995) 
LC  Australia, Canada, Sweden, West 
Germany, United States, United 
Kingdom: PIT, payroll taxes, 
other direct taxes 




LY95  United States: PIT, SSC, property 
taxes, social benefits 
“Current Population Survey” 
Jännti (1997)  S82  Canada, the Netherlands, 
Sweden, United Kingdom, United 
States: PIT, SSC, social benefits 
“Luxembourg Income Study”; 
E : implied by the U.S. poverty 
line 
Ervik (1998)  RE   8 high-income countries: PIT, 
SSC, social benefits 
“Luxembourg Income Study”; 
) 5 (. 1 E  
Kakwani, Lambert 
(1998) 
KL  Australia: PIT  “Household Expenditure Survey”; 
) 1 ,. 7 ,. 4 ,. 2 ,. 1 ( 4 E  
Aronson, Lambert, 
Trippeer (1999) 
AJL  United States: PIT  “Statistics of Income Panel of 
Individual Returns”; 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Fellman, Jäntti, 
Lambert (1999) 
K V   Finland: personal taxes and social 
benefits 
Household Budget Survey; 
) 5 ,. 7 (. 3 E  
van Doorslaer et al. 
(1999) 
AJL  12 OECD countries: various 
sources of financing health 
expenditures: taxes, social and 
private insurance, direct payments 
Household budget surveys; 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Wagstaff et al. 
(1999a) 
AJL  12 OECD countries: PIT  Household budget surveys; 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Wagstaff et al. 
(1999b) 
K
T P~   12 OECD countries: various 
sources of financing health 
expenditures: taxes, social and 
private insurance, direct payments 
Household budget surveys; 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Duclos (2000)  K84; L85  Canada: personal taxes and social 
benefits 
“Survey of Consumer Finances”; 
) 5 ,. 7 (. 3 E  
Förster (2000)  LC, S82  21 OECD countries: PIT, SSC, 
social benefits 
national household budget 
surveys and tax administration 25 
 
Authors Indices  / 
decompositions 
used 
Countries / Fiscal coverage  Data sources / equivalence 
scales 
databases; 
) 5 (. 1 E  
Duclos, Lambert 
(2000) 
DL  Canada: personal taxes and social 
benefits 
“Survey of Consumer Finances”; 
) 5 ,. 7 (. 3 E  
Iyer, Seetharaman 
(2000) 
AJL  United States: PIT  “Statistics of Income Panel of 
Individual Returns”; 
ITP 
Creedy, van de Ven 
(2001) 
VCL  Australia: personal taxes and 
social benefits 
Simulated incomes over the life 
cycle 
   ) 1 , 0 , 1 , 0 ( 2 E  
Dardanoni, Lambert 
(2001) 
DL01  United Kingdom, Israel, Canada: 
cash benefits and direct taxes 
“Family Expenditure Survey” and 
EBORTAX (for UK), “Family 
Expenditure Survey” (Israel), 
“Survey of Consumer Finances” 
(Canada); 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Decoster, Van Camp 
(2001) 
K P , 
K V   Belgium: PIT and indirect taxes  Administrative data (IPCAL) with 
microsimulated taxes; household 
budget survey (ASTER); 
) 5 ,. 7 (. 3 E  
Heady, Mitrakos, 
Tsakloglou (2001) 




) 3 ,. 5 (. 3 E  
Smith (2001)  K P   Australia: PIT  Aggregated data from annual 
statistics (1917-1997); 
ITP 
van de Ven, Creedy, 
Lambert (2001) 
VCL  Australia: personal taxes and 
social benefits 





K P )  15 OECD countries: PIT  OECD data base (decile groups); 
ITP 
Creedy (2002)  VCL  Australia: Goods and Services 
Tax 
“Household Expenditure Survey”; 




DL02  see Dardanoni, Lambert (2001) see Dardanoni, Lambert (2001) 
Duclos, Jalbert, 
Araar (2003) 
DJA  Canada: PIT, SSC, social benefits  “Survey of Consumer Finances”; 
) 5 ,. 7 (. 3 E ,  ) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Thoresen (2004)  K P   Norway: PIT  “Income Distribution 
Survey”; ) 5 (. 1 E  
Verbist (2004)  PL (
K P )  EU-15 countries: PIT, SSC paid 
by employees, other income taxes 
EUROMOD data; 
) 3 ,. 5 (. 3 E  
Dyck (2005)  RSA  Canada: overall fiscal system  “Social Policy Simulation 
Database and Model” 
census family groups 
Hyun, Lim (2005)  AJL  South Korea: PIT  Administrative data – 
microsimulated taxes; 26 
 
Authors Indices  / 
decompositions 
used 
Countries / Fiscal coverage  Data sources / equivalence 
scales 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Immervoll et al. 
(2005) 
RE   EU-15 countries: PITs, SSC paid 
by employees, other income 
taxes, social benefits, public 
pensions 
EUROMOD data; 




K P   Cameroon: wide range of direct 
and indirect taxes, expenditures 
for health and education 
“ECAM2” (household budget 
survey), 2001; additional 
government sources 
Mahler, Jesuit (2006)  RE   13 high-income countries: PIT, 
SSC, social benefits 
“Luxembourg Income Study”; 
) 5 (. 1 E  
Urban (2006)  PL (




K P   Abidjan (Ivory Coast), Bamako 
(Mali), Conakry (Guinea) and 
Dakar (Mali): health care 
payments  
questionnaires 
Čok, Urban (2007)  UL  Slovenia and Croatia: PIT and 
SSC 
Administrative tax data; 
ITP 
Creedy et al. (2008)  RE , 
K P   New Zealand: PIT, Family Tax 
Credit, unemployment benefit, 
superannuation, Working for 
Families, accommodation 
supplement 
“Household Expenditure Survey”  
) 6 ,. 7 (. 2 E  
Urban (2008)  K84; LY95; 
L85 
Croatia: PIT, SSC, social 
benefits, public pensions 
“APK” (household budget 
survey); 
) 3 ,. 5 (. 3 E  
Urban, Lambert 
(2008) 
UL  Croatia: PIT  Administrative tax data; 
ITP 
Kim, Lambert (2009)  UL; L85  United States: PIT, Earned 
Income Tax Credit, property tax, 
payroll tax, social benefits 
“Current Population Survey” and 
“Annual Social and Economic 
Supplement”; 
) 5 ,. 5 (. 2 E  
Lambert, Thoresen 
(2009) 
BD, KJ; DL01, 
DL02; DL 
Norway: PIT  “Income Distribution Survey”; 
) ( ?  E  
Zaidi (2009)  RE   Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland, Czech 
R., Estonia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Latvia: social benefits, PIT, SSC, 
taxes on wealth 
“EU-SILC” databases; 
) 3 ,. 5 (. 3 E  
Notes: 
(a) The term “social benefits”, if not specified differently, denotes a wide range of cash and near-cash direct 
transfers from government to the households (near-cash transfers are in-kind benefits whose values are easily 
determined). 
(b) ITP = unit of observation is individual tax-payer 
(c) The meaning of the terms like  ) 5 (. 1 E  etc., is explained in the following section. 27 
 
Classification of studies 
By equivalence scales  
The third class of information presented in Table 5 relates to data sources and equivalence 
scales. Almost all studies deal with household budget survey data, while administrative data are 
used only in the studies of PIT progressivity. Household data require some form of aggregation / 
averaging at the household level – equivalence scales are used for this purpose. The two most 
frequent types of scales are: the so-called “Cutler and Katz” scale (denoted with E2) and the 
“OECD” scale (denoted with E3). Both of them take into account economies of scale and 
recognize the difference between children and adults. 
Table 5: Equivalence scales 
) ( 1  E  
 ) (n m   power / root scale 
) , ( 2   E  
  ) ( c a n n m     “Cutler and Katz” scale  
) , ( 3   E   c a n n m       ) 1 ( 1   “OECD” scale  
) , , , , ( 3 2 1 4      E   w c c c a n n n n n m           ) ( 3 3 2 2 1 1    
Notes: m = equivalent adults; n  = adults and children;  a n  = adults;  c n  = children;  1 c n / 2 c n / 3 c n  = children aged 
0-5/6-14/15-17 years;  w n  = working adults. 
By methodologies used  
In this part we present the classification of empirical studies from Table 4 according to 
the methodology employed. Table 6 is divided into two major parts, distinguishing two groups of 
approaches: (a) those based on Kakwani (1977b), and (b) other approaches. Indices and 
decompositions rooted in Kakwani (1977b) were used 49 times, while other methodologies in the 
measurement of the redistributive effects were employed in 15 papers. It was already mentioned 
that the selection of studies is not exhaustive and is biased toward the research capturing both 
taxes and benefits (see footnote 14), but anyway, the ratio of 3:1 evidences that Kakwani’s 
methodologies pervade the field. 
Many studies have estimated only one of the main indices. Thus, the index of the 
redistributive effect (RE ), Kakwani index of progressivity (
K P ), Kakwani index of vertical 
effect (
K V ) and Atkinson-Plotnick index of reranking (
AP R ) are used in 6, 9, 2 and 2 studies, 
respectively. Among the various decompositions of these indices, we have to mention Kakwani 
(1984), used in 5 studies. This may seem a small number given the importance devoted to the 28 
 
decomposition in this chapter. However, we must remember another decomposition which 
originates from Kakwani’s, and this is one is the most popular: Aronson, Johnson and Lambert 
(1994). It served as a tool in 6 studies, and if we add studies based on adaptations of this 
decomposition (VCL and UL) we arrive at the number of 12. 
What about the studies that attempted to reveal the contributions of individual taxes and 
benefits to the redistributive effect? Three methodologies were developed to cope with this task, 
as we have seen above. Lambert (1985) attracted most attention, with 5 studies employing it, 
while approaches by Jenkins (1988) and Duclos (1993) were not adopted in later studies. 
Table 6: Overview of methodologies used in measurement of income redistribution 
Symbol / 
Abbrev. 
Approach  Studies using the methodology 
(a) Approaches based on Kakwani (1977b) 
RE   the redistributive effect (a difference between Gini 
coefficients of pre- and post-TB income) 
Reynolds, Smolensky (1977), 
Ervik (1998),  
Immervoll et al. (2005),  
Johannes, Akwi, Anzah (2006),  
Mahler, Jesuit (2006),  
Creedy et al. (2008) [6] 
K P   Kakwani (1977b) index of progressivity   Kakwani (1977b),  
Norregaard (1990),  
Wagstaff et al. (1999b),  
Decoster, Van Camp (2001),  
Smith (2001),  
Thoresen (2004),  
Johannes, Akwi, Anzah (2006), 
Cissé, Luchini, Moatti (2007), 
Creedy et al. (2008) [9] 
K V   Kakwani (1977b) index of vertical effect   Fellman, Jäntti, Lambert (1999), 
Decoster, Van Camp (2001) [2] 
AP R   Atkinson (1980) / Plotnick (1981) index of reranking  Plotnick (1981), 
Plotnick (1985) [2] 






Urban (2008) [5] 
L85  Lambert (1985) decomposition of vertical effect for 





Kim, Lambert (2009) [5] 
PL  Pfähler (1990) / Lambert (2001) decomposition of 
K P  and 
K V  
Wagstaff, van Doorslaer (2001), 
Verbist (2004),  
Urban (2006) [3] 
LY95  Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) decomposition of the 
redistributive effect 
Lerman, Yitzhaki (1995),  
Urban (2008) [2] 
KL  Kakwani, Lambert (1998) decomposition of the 
redistributive effect 




Approach  Studies using the methodology 
AJL  Aronson, Johnson, Lambert (1994) decomposition of 
the redistributive effect, as originally applied 
Aronson, Johnson, Lambert (1994),  
Aronson, Lambert, Trippeer (1999),  
van Doorslaer et al. (1999),  
Wagstaff et al. (1999a),  
Iyer, Seetharaman (2000),  
Hyun, Lim (2005) [6] 
VCL  van de Ven, Creedy, Lambert (2001) adaptation of 
AJL decomposition 
van de Ven, Creedy, Lambert (2001), 
Creedy, van de Ven (2001), 
Creedy (2002) [3] 
UL  Urban, Lambert (2005, 2008) adaptation of AJL 
decomposition 
Čok, Urban (2007),  
Urban, Lambert (2008) 
Kim, Lambert (2009) [3] 
D93  Duclos (1993) decomposition of vertical and 
reranking effect for the net fiscal system 
Duclos (1993) 
J88  Jenkins (1988) decomposition of vertical and 
reranking effect for the net fiscal system 
Jenkins (1988)  
(b) Other approaches 
MT R   Musgrave, Thin (1948) index of the redistributive 
effect 
Dilnot, Kay, Norris (1984) 
BS  Berliant, Strauss (1984) measures of vertical and 
horizontal inequity 
Berliant, Strauss (1985) 
DJA  Duclos, Jalbert, Araar (2003) decomposition of the 
change in inequality 
Duclos, Jalbert, Araar (2003) 
DL  Duclos, Lambert (2000) measurement of horizontal 
and vertical inequity 
Duclos, Lambert (2000) 
DL01  Dardanoni, Lambert (2001) horizontal inequity 
comparisons 
Dardanoni, Lambert (2001)  
DL02  Dardanoni, Lambert (2002) progressivity comparisons  Dardanoni, Lambert (2002)  
LC  Lorenz curves comparisons  Bishop, Chow, Formby (1995),  
Förster (2000) [2] 
LY94  Lerman, Yitzhaki (1994) decomposition of Gini 
coefficient 
Lerman, Yitzhaki (1994) 
PCF  Pyatt, Chen, Fei (1980) decomposition of Gini 
coefficient 
Heady, Mitrakos, Tsakloglou (2001) 
RSA  Baum (1987) relative share adjustment index   Dyck (2005) 
S82  Shorrocks (1982) decompositions  Jännti (1997),  
Förster (2000) [2] 
Tm  Atkinson (1980) analysis of reranking using transition 
matrices 
Atkinson (1980),  
Nolan (1987) [2] 
KJ  King (1983) / Jenkins (1994) “no reranking 
procedure” 
Lambert, Thoresen (2009) 
BD  Blackorby, Donaldson (1984) index of progressivity  Lambert, Thoresen (2009) 




5  Conclusion 
Kakwani’s (1984) decomposition of redistributive effect into vertical and reranking 
indices became the cornerstone for much research on income redistribution. This is evidenced by 30 
 
the huge number of empirical studies employing it, and plenty of extensions and upgrades 
provided by its supporters. This paper describes the origins of the Kakwani decomposition and of 
its components. It reviews other different methodologies in decomposing redistributive effect, 
rooted in the Kakwani decomposition. Finally, an overview of empirical research is presented 
accounting for about fifty of different studies. 
Careful study of the origins of the Kakwani decomposition, and of the different concepts 
and indices it brought together into one framework, has revealed contrasting opinions of different 
scholars on the possibility, meaning and interpretation of the decomposition. Atkinson (1980) 
and Plotnick (1981), who invented the reranking term, implicitly suggested to future users and 
developers to be cautious about introduction of it into more comprehensive frameworks. 
Nonetheless, the Kakwani decomposition is exactly such a model capturing vertical equity and 
reranking. 
For Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995) one of the weaknesses of the Kakwani approach is the use 
of pre-tax income rankings. More reranking is regarded by these authors as favourable from the 
policy maker’s perspective, because the increase in the Atkinson-Plotnick reranking index (
AP R ) 
automatically increases the Kakwani vertical effect (
K V ). On the other side, for both Kakwani 
(1984) and Lerman and Yitzhaki (1995), reranking has an active role in the determination of the 
magnitude of redistributive effect, and this is completely opposite to the views of Atkinson 
(1980) and Plotnick (1980). Kakwani’s contributions have inspired many followers to claim that 
elimination of reranking would increase or decrease the redistributive effect. 
Thus, one of the main purposes of this paper is to call for further research which should 
examine these problems more thoroughly. Such research has already begun, resulting in the 
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